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Abstract
Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent
likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules.
The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator,
is Strategyproof and guarantees to any group of like-minded agents an
influence proportional to its size. It is easier to compute and more efficient
than the familiar Random Priority rule. Its worst case (resp. average)
inefficiency is provably (resp. in numerical experiments) low if the number
of agents is low.
The efficient Egalitarian rule protects similarly individual agents but
not coalitions. It is Excludable Strategyproof : I do not want to lie if I
cannot consume outcomes I claim to dislike.
The efficient Nash Max Product rule offers the strongest welfare guar-
antees to coalitions, who can force any outcome with a probability pro-
portional to their size. But it fails even the excludable form of Strate-
gyproofness.
1 Introduction
Interactive democracy aka Liquid Democracy (see e.g., (Behrens, 2017; Brill,
2017)) is a new approach to voting well suited for low stakes/ high frequency
decisions, and easily implemented on the internet (Grandi, 2017). An especially
successful instance is budgetary participation (Cabannes, 2004) where the stake-
holders (citizens, employees of a firm, club members) vote to decide which subset
of public projects the community, firm, or club should implement.
We discuss a stylized version of this process in the probabilistic voting
model (Fishburn, 1984; Gibbard, 1977). The guiding principle of our analy-
sis is that the selection of a single (deterministic) public outcome is prima facie
unfair: fairness requires compromise, we must select a mixture of several mu-
tually exclusive outcomes. The mixture may come from actual randomization,
or the allocation of time-shares, or the distribution of a fixed amount of some
resource (e.g., money) over these outcomes. Some typical examples follow.
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In reference (Cabannes, 2004), the city authority must divide funds or staff
between several projects (library, sport center, concert hall) taking into account
the citizens’ wishes. The scheduling of one or several weekly club meetings
(gym classes, chess club, study group) must accomodate the time constraints
reported by the club members. Or the local public TV, after polling its audience,
must divide broadcasting time between different languages, or different types
of program (news, sports, movies). In the fair knapsack problem, the server
schedules repeatedly jobs of different reported or observed sizes under a capacity
constraint, and must pick a (random) serving protocol.
In all these examples, fairness requires to give some share of the public
resources to everyone: each club member should have access to some meetings;
everyone should enjoy at least some TV programs, etc.. This contrasts with
traditional high stakes/low frequency voting contexts, where the first best is
to select a single (deterministic) outcome, and randomization over outcomes is
only second best.1
We run into the familiar conflict between protecting minorities and
submitting to the will of the majority (Young, 1950; Gordon, 1994;
Porta, de Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny, 2000). On the one hand, the larger
the support for a public outcome, the bigger should be its share in the final
compromise: numbers matter. On the other hand, we must protect minorities
with their idiosyncratic preferences for outcomes disliked by the majority. So
the club meetings will be more frequent when many members can attend, but
nobody will be entirely excluded; the knapsack server will favor short jobs be-
cause this increases the number of satisfied customers, but it cannot ignore long
jobs entirely; and so on.
We analyze this tradeoff when preferences can be represented in a very simple
Facebook-style dichotomous form: each agent likes or dislikes each outcome, and
her utility is simply the total share of her likes. Agents in the knapsack problem
care only about their expected service time, and in the club example, about
the number of meetings they can attend. Though less natural in the public TV
and the library funding examples, where they rule out any complementarities
between outcomes, dichotomous preferences are still of practical interest because
they are easy to elicit.
We discuss the fairness and incentive compatibility properties of three mostly
well known social choice rules.
Our results. The Fair Share guarantee principle is central to the fair division
literature since the earliest cake division papers (Steinhaus, 1948). In our model
this is the Individual Fair Share (IFS) axiom: each one of the n agents “owns”
a 1/n-th share of decision power, so she can ensure an outcome she likes at
least 1/n-th of the time (or with probability at least 1/n). To capture the more
subtle ideas that minorities should be protected, and numbers should matter as
1It is used to break ties, or to play the role of an absent deterministic Condorcet winner:
for instance (Laffond, Laslier, and Le Breton, 1993; Aziz, Brandl, Brandt, and Brill, 2017a;
Brandt, 2017) identifies a lottery that, in a certain sense, wins the majority tournament.
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well, we strengthen IFS to Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), giving to any group of
like-minded agents an influence proportional to its size: so if 10% of the agents
have identical preferences they should like the outcome at least 10% of the time.
Our starting point is the impossibility result in
(Bogomolnaia, Moulin, and Stong, 2005), where our model and the two
fairness properties IFS and UFS appear first: no mixing rule can be efficient,
incentive compatible in the prior-free sense of Strategyproofness (SP), and meet
Unanimous, or even Individual, Fair Share. We introduce new fairness and
incentives properties and offer instead possibility results. Three remarkable
mixing rules (two of them well known) meet IFS and achieve, loosely speaking,
two out of the three goals of efficiency, group fairness (in the sense of UFS or
other more demanding properties), and incentive compatibility.
Start with the Egalitarian (EGAL) rule, adapting to our model a celebrated
principle of distributive justice. Taking the probability that the selected out-
come is liked by agent i as her canonical utility, the rule maximizes first the
utility level we can guarantee to all agents; among the corresponding mixtures,
it maximizes the utility we can guarantee to all agents but one; and so on. It
is efficient and implements IFS, therefore it is not strategyproof, by the above
mentioned result. However if public outcomes are non rival but excludable, we
can force agents to consume only those outcomes they claim to like, so it be-
comes more costly to fake a dislike and the strategyproofness is correspondingly
weakened. A meeting of the club is such an excludable public outcome: it is
easy to exclude from the meeting those who reported they could not attend;
broadcasting via cable TV is similarly excludable, not so via aerial broadcast-
ing. The Egalitarian rule is efficient as well as Excludable Strategyproof (EXSP):
misreporting one’s preferences does not pay, provided an agent is excluded from
consuming those public outcomes she reportedly dislikes (Theorem 1). Thus
weakening SP to EXSP resolves the impossibility result.
But numbers do not matter to the egalitarian rule: it treats a unanimous
group of agents exactly as if it contained a single agent, so the UFS property
obviously fails. A related problem is that if I have a clone (another agent with
preferences identical to mine), I can simply stay home and nothing will change.
The Strict Participation (PART∗) axiom takes care of this disenfranchisement
problem by insisting that casting his vote is strictly benefitial to each voter. So
the EGAL rule is only appealing if we focus on individual guarantees and are
comfortable treating a homogenous group as a single person. This makes sense
if the club must offer some important training to its members. But in the bud-
getary participation or the broadcasting examples, numbers should definitely
matter.
The Conditional Utilitarian (CUT) rule is a simple variant of the classic
“random dictator”. Each agent identifies, among the outcomes he likes, those
with the largest support from the other agents: then he spreads the probability
(time share) of 1/n uniformly over the outcomes he likes. So the utilitarian
concern is conditional upon guaranteeing one’s full utility first: charity begins at
home. The CUT rule is related to, but much simpler than, the Random Priority
(RP) rule averaging outcomes of all deterministic priority rules. Both rules are
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SP, meet PART∗ and guarantee UFS. Therefore they are inefficient. But CUT
is much easier to compute and strictly more efficient than RP (Theorem 2).
In numerical simulations (Section 9) and for relatively small values of n, its
inefficiency is consistently low.
Our third rule is the familiar Nash Max Product (NMP) rule picking the
mixture maximizing the product of individual utilities. It is efficient and offers
much stronger welfare guarantees to groups than UFS. We introduce two re-
quirements, each one a considerable strengthening of UFS, intuitively but not
logically related. The Core Fair Share (CFS) property has an incentive flavor
in the spirit of cumulative voting (Gordon, 1994; Sawyer and MacRae, 1962):
any group of agents can pool their shares of decision power and object to the
proposed mixture z by enforcing another mixture z′ with a probability propor-
tional to the group size. Core Fair Share rules out any such objection. Finally
Average Fair Share (AFS) applies to any coalition with a common liked out-
come: the average utility in such a group cannot be smaller than its relative
size. In simple examples, AFS limits very effectively the set of acceptable ef-
ficient mixtures. Theorem 3 shows that the efficient NMP rule meets PART∗,
CFS and AFS but fails even EXSP.
The results suggest several challenging open questions about the impossibil-
ity frontiers of our model.
2 Related literature
Budgetary participation is an important new aspect of participative democracy,
reviewed in (Cabannes, 2004). Our model casts this process as a probabilistic
voting problem, introduced first by Gibbard (1977) as a way to design non dic-
tatorial strategyproof decision rules. The literature he inspired viewed random-
ization as a way around the defects of deterministic rules, mostly to allow anony-
mous and neutral rules, or to circumvent the absence of Condorcet winners (see
e.g, Fishburn, 1984; Laffond et al., 1993; Aziz et al., 2017a; Aziz and Stursberg,
2014; Brandl, Brandt, and Seedig, 2016). But recent work turns its attention
to mixtures of outcomes with time-sharing or compromise in mind: see e.g.,
(Bogomolnaia et al., 2005; Aziz and Stursberg, 2014; Aziz, 2013; Aziz, 2017;
Fain, Goel, and Munagala, 2016; Benade, Nath, Procaccia, and Shah, 2017).
Our works takes direct inspiration from Bogomolnaia, Moulin, and Stong
(2002); Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) who introduced the model of randomised
voting under dichotomous preferences. In the same mathematical model we
present several new results about new normative requirements such as partici-
pation incentives, a decentralization axiom, weaker forms of strategyproofness,
and stronger forms of fairness.
Two of our rules, EGAL and NMP, maximize respectively a familiar social
welfare ordering and a classic collective utility function. The EGAL rule is the
lead mechanism in the related assignment model with dichotomous preferences
in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004). In probabilistic voting, the Egalitarian Si-
multaneous Reservation rule of Aziz and Stursberg (2014) can be seen as an
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adaptation of the Egalitarian rule.
Recent literature emphasizes that the NMP rule is central to the competi-
tive approach of the fair division of private commodities, whether divisible or
indivisible (Caragiannis, Kurokawa, Moulin, Procaccia, Shah, and Wang, 2016;
Bogomolnaia, Moulin, Sandomirskyi, and Yanovskaya, 2017). We find here a
new application of this rule in the public decision making context, closer in
spirit to Nash’s original bargaining model (Nash, 1950). Our results are related
to those of Fain et al. (2016), who also propose the NMP rule for budgetary
participation, reinterpret this rule as a Lindahl equilibrium, and discuss its
computational complexity. They allow for more general preferences than ours
(in particular, full-fledged vNM utilities), and show the Core Fair Share prop-
erty (Corollary 1 Section 2.3) just like in statement i) of our Theorem 3. They
do not discuss incentives properties or any alternative rule.
The rules CUT and RP are non welfarist, in that they do not maximize
any social welfare ordering. The RP rule is well known (and was discussed in
Bogomolnaia et al. (2005)), and CUT is a fairly simple twist on the random
dictator first introduced by Duddy (2015) who noted that it is strategyproof
but did not develop its normative appeal.
Fair Share is an early design constraint of decision mechanisms: see the
mathematical literature on cake cutting (Steinhaus, 1948), and on fair division
of microeconomic commodities (Moulin, 2003; Varian, 1974; Thomson, 2016).
The group version of Fair Share captures the ubiquitous “protection of mi-
norities” principle that is formally related to cooperative stability in standard
voting. It is also related to the proportional veto principle (Moulin, 1981,
1982) and motivates practical twists in the rules such as cumulative voting,
especially concerned with the protection of ethnic minorities in political elec-
tions (Sawyer and MacRae, 1962), or minority stockholders in corporate gov-
ernance (Young, 1950; Gordon, 1994; Porta et al., 2000). See also the same
concerns for EU enlargement Hughes and Sasse (2003). Our fairness notions
are closely related to proportional representation axioms in multi-winner voting
as well (see e.g., Aziz, Brill, Conitzer, Elkind, Freeman, and Walsh (2017b)).
Strict Participation has been considered in the deterministic voting model,
leading mostly to negative results. Our results complement those of Brandl,
Brandt, and Hofbauer (2015) who undertook a formal study of participation
incentives in probabilistic voting.
3 The Model
A generic agent is i ∈ N , and n = |N |. A pure public outcome is a ∈ A, and a
mixture of public outcomes is an element z of the simplex ∆(A), interpreted as
a lottery over A, a profile of time shares, or shares of other types of resources
between the outcomes in A. Both N and A are finite.
A utility function ui = (uia)a∈A is an element of {0, 1}A. Agents who dislike
all outcomes play no role in any or the rules we discuss, thus we exclude them
at once: the domain of preferences is Ω = {0, 1}A{0}, where 0 = 0A; and
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u ∈ ΩN is a profile of utility functions. In the examples we always represent u
as a N×Amatrix filled with 0-s and 1-s, and we use the notation: uS =
∑
i∈S ui
and uSB =
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈B uia for S ⊆ N and B ⊆ A.
A problem M is a triple M = (N,A, u) where u ∈ ΩN .
Actual utilities (welfare) at z are written Ui = ui · z, and the corresponding
utility profile is written U = u · z ∈ [0, 1]N . The set of feasible utility profiles
is Φ(M) = {U = u · z|z ∈ ∆(A)}. Given U ∈ Φ(M) we set ϕ−1(U) = {z ∈
∆(A)|U = u · z}.
Definition 1
i) In problem M = (N,A, u) a feasible utility profile U ∈ Φ(M) is efficient if
there is no profile U ′ ∈ Φ(M) such that U ≤ U ′ and at least one inequality
Ui ≤ U ′i is strict.
ii) A mixture z ∈ ∆(A) is efficient in M if the profile u · z is efficient.
iii) Fix ε ∈ [0, 1]; the profile U ∈ Φ(M) is ε-efficient if there exists U ′ ∈ Φ(M)
such that U ≤ εU ′.
Definition 2
i) A rule F picks one U ∈ Φ(M) for each problem M ; the mapping f picks
the corresponding mixtures: f(M) = ϕ−1(F (M)), so that F (M) = u · f(M).
Moreover F and f are Anonymous (treat agents symmetrically) and Neutral
(treat outcomes symmetrically).
ii) The rule F is efficient if it selects an efficient profile in every problem. For
any n the rule is ε(n)-inefficient if a) there exists a problem M of size n and a
profile U ∈ Φ(M) such that F (M) is ε(n)-inefficient, and b) no smaller number
ε′(n) meets this property.
A rule is “welfarist” by design, in the sense that it does not distinguish
between mixtures resulting in the same utility profile. For instance if two out-
comes a, b are “clones” in problem M (liked by exactly the same agents), a rule
is oblivious to shifting some weight from a to b.
The efficient pure outcomes in A are easy to recognize: a is efficient if and
only if there is no b such that the set of agents liking b is strictly larger than
the set liking a. We call such outcomes undominated. In the following example
N ↓ A→ a b c d e
1 0 0 0 1 1
2 0 0 1 1 0
3 1 1 0 0 0
4 1 0 1 0 0
5 0 1 0 1 1
(1)
outcome e is dominated by d, and the four other outcomes are undominated.
However, convex combinations of undominated outcomes may well be inefficient.
In the example, any mixture z such that zb, zc are both positive, say zb, zc ≥
α > 0, can be improved by redistributing the weight α to a and to d. That is,
z is Pareto inferior to the mixture
z′ = (za + α, zb − α, zc − α, zd + α, ze).
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Of special interest are those problems where any mixture of undominated
pure outcomes is efficient: in the probabilistic interpretation of our model this
means that ex post efficiency implies ex ante efficiency. Indeed the four rules
we discuss below mix only undominated outcomes, so in such problems their
efficiency is guaranteed.
In our first (minor) result, the set of outcomes liked by an agent is called
her like-set.
Lemma All mixtures of undominated (pure) outcomes are efficient in prob-
lem M in two cases:
i) If |A| ≤ 3 and/or |N | ≤ 4;
ii) If A can be ordered in such a way that the like-set of every agent is an
interval.
Statement i) is proven by Duddy (2015); it implies that example (1) has the
smallest sizes of A and N for which a combination of undominated outcomes is
inefficient.
Proof of statement ii)
Fix a problem M as in statement ii). If some outcomes are “clones” (liked by
exactly the same set of agents), a class of clones is an interval as well and it is
clearly enough to prove the statement for the “decloned” problem where each
interval of clones has shrunk to a single outcome. Thus we can assume that
our problem has no clones.
Let A∗ denote the subset of undominated pure outcomes. We fix a mixture
z with support in A∗ (z ∈ ∆(A∗)) and assume some other mixture y ∈ ∆(A∗)
makes everyone weakly better off than z: we will show y = z, which implies the
statement.
We keep in mind that for any two a, b in A∗ there is some agent i who likes a
but not b, because a and b are not clones. Write the ordered set A∗as {1, · · · ,K}
and apply this remark to the first two agents: some agent i likes 1 but not 2,
hence i likes only 1 and ui · z ≤ ui · y implies z1 ≤ y1. Some agent j likes 2 but
not 3, hence j likes 1, 2 or just 2, so uj · z ≤ uj · y is either z12 ≤ y12 or z2 ≤ y2
and either way we deduce z12 ≤ y12. Similarly there is some k who likes 3 but
not 4, so uk · z ≤ uk · y means that at least one of z3, z23, and z123 increases
weakly and inequality z123 ≤ y123 follows in each case. An obvious induction
argument gives
z12···k ≤ y12···k for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K
The symmetric argument starting from outcome K gives
zk(k+1)···K ≤ yk(k+1)···K for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K
and the desired conclusion y = z follows. 
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4 Excludable Strategyproofness; the Egalitarian
rule
We start with the familiar prior-free incentive compatibility requirement that
misreporting one’s preferences is never profitable if no agent can coordinate this
move with other agents.2
Notation: upon replacing in the profile u the coordinate ui by another u
′
i ∈
Ω, the resulting profile is (u|iu′i).
Strategyproofness (SP): ui·f(M) ≥ max
z′∈f(N,A,(u|iu′i))
ui·z′ for all M , i and u′i.
The simplest strategyproof rule adapts approval voting to our model: it
selects only those outcomes liked by the largest number of agents. Write Φp(M)
for the set of utility profiles implemented by pure outcomes in A: Φp(M) =
{U ∈ [0, 1]|∃a ∈ A∀i ∈ N,Ui = uia}. With the notation avg(Y ) for the uniform
average operation on a set Y of utility profiles, we define the
Utilitarian rule (UTIL): Fut(M) = avg{arg max
U∈Φp(M)
UN}.
Note that the rule deliberately treats a problem with two identical columns
exactly as the reduced problem where only one column remains.
The careful reader can check that this defines a rule in the sense of Defini-
tion 1, one that is efficient and strategyproof. However UTIL ignores minority
opinions entirely so it fails to address the normative concerns described in the
Introduction.
If an agent gets a fair 1/n-th share of total decision power, she will use it on
an outcome she likes. We take the following lower bound on individual welfare
as the first test that mixing is fair:
Individual Fair Share (IFS): U = F (M) =⇒ Ui ≥ 1
n
for all M and all i.
The main result of Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) is that a rule cannot be to-
gether Efficient, Strategyproof, and meet the Individual Fair Share. Our first
result is that this impossibility disappears if we weaken SP as explained below.
To motivate this weakening, we adapt to our model the extremely familiar idea
of equalizing individual utilities while respecting efficiency.
The lexicographic ordering in [0, 1]{1,··· ,n} maximizes the first coordinate,
and when this is not decisive, the second one, and so on. For a utility profile U ∈
[0, 1]N the vector U∗ ∈ [0, 1]{1,··· ,n} is obtained by rearranging its coordinates
increasingly. Then the leximin ordering ≻leximin compares U1 and U2 in [0, 1]N
exactly as the lexicographic ordering compares U1∗ and U2∗ in [0, 1]{1,··· ,n}.
Egalitarian rule (EGAL): F eg(M) = arg max
U∈Φ(M)
≻leximin .
2Recall from Propositions 2 and 3 in Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) that in our model group
versions of SP are not compatible with efficiency, even in the ex post sense.
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This maximization yields a unique and efficient utility profile (see e. g., Lemma
1.1 in (Moulin, 1988)). Anonymity and Neutrality are clear. To check Individual
fair Share, pick for each agent i a pure outcome ai she likes, and observe that the
uniform average of the ai-s ensures utility at least 1/n to each agent: therefore
the egalitarian profile Ueg must have Ueg∗1 ≥ 1/n.
Here is the simplest problem where the rule EGAL is vulnerable to a misre-
port of preferences:
true profile u =
N ↓ A→ a b c
1 1 1 0
2 0 1 0
3 0 0 1
→ misreport u˜ =
N ↓ A→ a b c
1 1 0˜ 0
2 0 1 0
3 0 0 1
.
At the true profile u outcome a is dominated and EGAL mixes b and c,
z = (0, 12 ,
1
2 ). After the misreport by agent 1, outcome a no longer appears
dominated and EGAL mixes equally the three outcomes, z˜ = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ). Agent
1’s utility raises from 1/2 at z to 2/3 at u˜, because he can enjoy outcome b despite
pretending not to. The latter is avoidable if the public outcome are excludable:
based on reported preferences, the mechanism excludes agents from consuming
outcomes they claim to dislike. Recall the discussion of this possibility in the
examples of Section 1.
The following incentives property, where we use the notation ui ∧ u′i for the
coordinate-wise minimum of the two utility functions, captures the resulting
weaker incentive compatibility requirement:
Excludable Strategyproofness (EXSP)
ui · f(M) ≥ max
z′∈f(N,A,(u|iu′i))
(ui ∧ u′i) · z′ for all M , i and u′i.
To make this definition more explicit, we identify the true utility ui by its like-
set Li = {a ∈ A|uia = 1}, and partition it as Li = L0i ∪L−i . Agent i’s misreports
is L′i = L
0
i ∪L+i where L+i ⊆ ALi: she pretends to like L+i and to dislike L−i .
The like-set of ui ∧ u′i is L0i therefore EXSP reads:
zL0i∪L−i ≥ z
′
L0i
for all z ∈ f(M), z′ ∈ f(N,A, (u|iu′i)).
It is useful to decompose EXSP in two statements. In the first one agent i
misreports only by inflating her like-set (Li = L
0
i ):
SP+: ui · f(M) ≥ max
z′∈f(N,A,(u|iu′i))
ui · z′ for all M , i and u′i s. t. ui ≤ u′i.
and in the second one, only by decreasing this set (L+i = ∅):
SP−: ui · f(M) ≥ max
z′∈f(N,A,(u|iu′i))
u′i · z′ for all M , i and u′i s. t. u′i ≤ ui.
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That EXSP equals the combination of SP+ and SP− is clear by applying
first SP− from ui to ui ∧ u′i, then SP+ from ui ∧ u′i to u′i. Similarly SP is the
combination of SP+ and SP∗:
SP∗: ui · f(M) ≥ max
z′∈f(N,A,(u|iu′i))
ui · z′ for all M , i and u′i s. t. u′i ≤ ui.
and the above example shows that EGAL violates SP∗.
Theorem 1 The Egalitarian rule is Efficient, Excludable Strategyproof, and
guarantees Individual Fair Shares.
Proof
Preliminary notation and remarks : If M ⊆ N and U ∈ [0, 1]M then U∗ is the
set of distinct coordinates U∗k of U arranged increasingly; so U∗ may be of
lower dimension than M .
Fix a problem M = (N,A, u). For any M ⊆ N and convex compact C ⊆
∆(A) the projection on M of the set of feasible utility profiles Φ(C) = {U =
u·z|z ∈ C} is convex and compact, so it admits a unique leximin optimal element
that we write F eg(M,C, u) ∈ [0, 1]M . This extends the domain of the mapping
F eg, and note that we abuse notation by keeping u instead of its restriction to
M ×A.
Recall the algorithm defining U = F eg(M,C, u). Start with
U∗1 = max
z∈C
min
j∈M
{uj · z}..
Write N1 for the set of agents achieving this minimum, P 1 = NN1, and
C1 = {z ∈ C|uj · z = U∗1 for all j ∈ N1}. We stop if N1 = N , otherwise we set
U∗2 = maxz∈C1 minj∈P 1{uj · z}. We let N2 be the set of agents achieving U∗2,
P 2 = N(N1 ∪N2), and C2 the subset of C1 achieving U∗2 in N2; we stop if
P 2 = ∅, otherwise we set U∗3 = maxz∈C2 minj∈P 2{uj · z}, and so on. We end
up with a partition N = ∪Kk=1Nk such that Ui equals U∗k whenever i ∈ Nk.
Turning to the proof of statement i), we saw that it is enough to show
separately SP− and SP+. Fix an arbitrary M = (N,A, u). An agent who likes
all outcomes, ui = 1, cannot benefit from any misreport; pick now i ∈ N such
that uia = 0 for at least one a, and a profile u˜ identical to u for all j ∈ Ni and
such that ui  u˜i (so at least one 0 in ui is changed to a 1). Let U = F eg(N,A, u)
and U˜ = F eg(N,A, u˜) be implemented respectively by some lotteries z and z˜.
We prove successively:
U˜i ≥ Ui (2)
Ui = ui · z ≥ ui · z˜ (3)
The first inequality implies SP− (when i with true U˜i reports Ui), the second
gives SP+ (when i with true Ui reports U˜i).
We clearly have U˜ leximin U , in particular U˜∗1 ≥ U∗1: this proves (2) if
Ui = U
∗1. Assume for the rest of the proof Ui = U∗ℓ where ℓ ≥ 2. We check
first U˜∗1 = U∗1. If U˜∗1 > U∗1 we pick ε ∈]0, 1], and note that the mixture
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z′ = εz˜ + (1− ε)z ensures uj · z′ > U∗1 for all j ∈ Ni; for ε small enough we
also have ui · z′ > U∗1 because ui · z > U∗1. This contradicts the definition of
U∗1.
Set N1 = {j|Uj = U∗1} and N˜1 = {j|U˜j = U∗1}. We use a similar argument
to show next N1 ⊆ N˜1. If j ∈ N1 and uj · z˜ > U∗1, then for any ε ∈]0, 1] the
mixture z′ = εz˜+(1−ε)z gives uk·z′ ≥ U∗1 for all k ∈ N{j, i} and uj ·z′ > U∗1;
for ε small enough we also have ui · z′ > U∗1 (because Ui = U∗ℓ > U∗1) and
then z′ guarantees exactly U∗1 to a smaller set of agents than z, and strictly
more to all others. This implies that u ·z′ leximin-dominates u ·z, contradiction.
Similarly the strict inclusion N1  N˜1 would imply that the vector U˜ is
strictly leximin-dominated by U , which we saw is not true.
So far we have shown that the maxi-minimization of feasible utilities – the
first step in the algorithm defining the leximin solution– gives at u and u˜ identi-
cal values U∗1 and U˜∗1, and identical sets N1 and N˜1. Now the second step of
the algorithms, delivering U∗2, U˜∗2, andN2, N˜2, is the same maxi-minimization
problem applied in both cases to C1 = {z ∈ ∆(A)|uj · z = U∗1 for all j ∈ N1}
and P 1 = NN1. Mimicking the above proof we deduce that, if Ui = U∗2 then
U˜i ≥ Ui, and if Ui = U∗ℓ for some ℓ ≥ 3, then U∗2 = U˜∗2, N2 = N˜2. The
induction argument establishing U∗k = U˜∗k, Nk = N˜k up to k = ℓ − 1, and
finally (2) is now clear.
To prove (3) we compare the profiles u · z and u · z˜. We just saw that they
coincide on NP ℓ−1 = ∪ℓ−1k=1Nk, and that if a mixture guarantees utility U∗k to
all agents in Nk for k = 1, · · · , ℓ− 1, it cannot guarantee (at u) more than U∗ℓ
to all agents in P ℓ−1: z and z˜ are two such lotteries, so if ui · z˜ > ui · z = U∗ℓ,
there is some j ∈ P ℓ−1 for whom uj ·z˜ < U∗ℓ. But U˜∗ℓ ≥ U∗ℓ (because U˜ weakly
leximin-dominates U) and u˜j · z˜ = uj · z˜ ≥ U˜∗ℓ, thus we reach a contradiction.

5 Strict Participation and Unanimous Fair
Share
A striking feature of the Egalitarian rule is Clone Invariance: if at least one
voter who shares my preferences does vote, adding my own vote will not change
the resulting mixture. This holds because, fixing an agent i, the leximin ordering
compares two utility profiles U and U ′ in the same way as U˜ and U˜ ′, where from
V to V˜ we add an (n+1)-th coordinate repeating Vi. Thus the rule is oblivious
to the size of support for a particular preference, an unpalatable feature in all
the examples discussed in the introduction.
We now define two requirements capturing, each in a different way, the
concern that numbers should matter. The first one is an incentive property.
Given a problem M and agent i, define M(−i) = (Ni, A, u−i) and
Ui(−i) = maxz∈f(M(−i)) ui · z.
Participation (PART): Fi(M) ≥ Ui(−i) for all M and i.
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The violation of Participation is commonly called the No Show Para-
dox (Fishburn and Brams, 1983): a voter is better off abstaining to go to the
polls. In the context of budgetary participation, we want more: everyone should
have a strict incentive to show up, lest many agents, feeling disenfranchised, will
stay home or put a blank ballot, and the result of the vote will not give an ac-
curate picture of the opinion profile.
Strict Participation (PART∗):
Fi(M) ≥ Ui(−i) and {Ui(−i) < 1 =⇒ Fi(M) > Ui(−i)} for all M and i.
Under dichotomous preferences that we consider, strong SD-participation
and SD-participation as studied by Brandl, Brandt, and Hofbauer (2015) coin-
cide with PART and very strong SD-participation coincides with PART∗. A
consequence of PART∗ is Clone Responsiveness : I am strictly better off if one
or more agents with preferences identical to mine cast their vote. Thus the
Egalitarian rule violates PART∗, although it satisfies PART.3
The second axiom, in the spirit of cumulative voting, allows groups of agents
with identical preferences to pool their respective shares of decision power. This
leads to the following strengthening of IFS, where we set again U = F (M):
Unanimity Fair Share (UFS) :
for all S ⊆ N : {ui = uj for all i, j ∈ S} =⇒ Ui ≥ |S|
n
for all i ∈ S.
In the statement of UFS the unanimous group S can be a minority or a
majority. However unanimous preferences are much more likely in small than
large groups, so this property will be more relevant in practice to minorities.
All three rules discussed in the next two sections meet Strict Participation
and Unanimous Fair Share. Thus they cannot be both efficient and strate-
gyproof. We start with two strategyproof rules.
6 Incentive compatibility and Fairness; the
Conditional Utilitarian rule
We introduce two rules adapting to our model the familiar random dictator
mechanism (see Gibbard (1977)). The difficulty is the treatment of indifferences:
if I can dictate the outcome for a 1/n-th share of the time, how should I choose
in my like-set ?
The first rule, introduced by Duddy (2015), applies a simple utilitarian test:
I focus on the outcomes liked by the largest number of other agents. Consider
the set Φp(M ; i) = {U ∈ Φp(M)|Ui = 1} of all the utility profiles corresponding
3Define U∗ = argmaxU∈Φ(M) ≻leximin ; U−1 = argmaxU∈Φ(M(−1)) ≻leximin and U1 =
U1(−1). If U1 > U∗1 we have successively U leximin (U1, U
∗) then (U1, U∗) ≻leximin U
∗,
contradiction.
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to the like-set of agent i. Each agent spreads her share 1
n
equally between the
profiles in Φp(M ; i) with maximal support:
Conditional Utilitarian (CUT) rule: F cut(M) =
1
n
∑
i∈N
avg{U |U ∈ arg max
U ′∈Φp(M ;i)
U ′N .}
Remark 1. Our definition of the domain Ω allows for agents who like all
outcomes, ui = 1
A. The presence of such agents is of no consequence for the
rules UTIL, EGAL, RP and NMP, but it does impact the mixture selected by
the CUT rule, as such agents put their weight on the utilitarian outcomes (those
with largest support). Suppose we choose to exclude those agents in the definition
of the CUT rule: this will not affect the incentives and fairness properties of the
rule identified below, nor its Decentralization property in Section 8.
The next rule uses a familiar hierarchical rule to resolve indifferences, that
plays a critical role in probabilistic voting ((Aziz, Brandt, and Brill, 2013)), as
well as for assigning indivisible private goods ((Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez,
1998), (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001)). Let Θ(N) be the set of strict order-
ings σ of N . For any σ ∈ Θ(N) the σ-Priority rule F σ guarantees full utility to
agent σ(1); next to agent σ(2) as well if 1 and 2 like a common outcome, else
σ(2) is deemed irrelevant; next to agent σ(3) if she likes an outcome that all
relevant agents before her like, else she is irrelevant; and so on.
Random Priority rule (RP)
F rp(M) =
1
n!
∑
σ∈Θ(N)
F σ(M) where F σ(M) = arg max
U∈Φ(M)
≻σlexico .
If mixtures in ∆(A) represent lotteries, the RP rule picks an ordering σ
with uniform probability and computes Uσ. But in other interpretations, time
shares or the distribution of other resources, this simple implementation is not
available. We retain nevertheless the intuitive probabilistic terminology.
After checking that both rules are incentive compatible and fair, we compare
them from the efficiency angle, and recap our discussion in Theorem 2 below.
Clearly each σ-Priority rule F σ is strategyproof, and SP is preserved by
convex combinations, thus RP is strategyproof as well. Checking PART∗ is
equally easy: to each ordering σ˜ of Ni we associate the n orderings σ of N
where i can have any rank from first to last: agent i is weakly better off at
F σ(M) than at F σ˜(M(−i)), strictly so if he is gets utility 0 in F σ˜(M(−i));
thus the only case where i does not strictly benefit by showing up is when he
gets utility 1 in F rp(M(−i)). For UFS, it is enough to observe that a member
of coalition S is first in σ with probability |S|
n
.
Check now that CUT meets the same three properties. UFS is clear. We
decompose SP into the combination of SP+ and SP∗. Start with SP∗: with
the notations just before Theorem 1, assume agent i’s like-set is Li = L
0
i ∪ L−i ,
and he reports L0i instead. Fix another agent j and check that the potential
change in the way j uses her 1/n-th share does not hurt i. If j was putting no
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weight in L−i , then she still loads exactly the same set. If j was only loading
(a subset of) L−i , she was helping i as much as possible and cannot do more
after the change. If j was loading some outcomes in L−i , some in B ⊆ L0i and
some in C ⊆ ALi, where B ∪C 6= ∅, then she redistributes all her weight on
L−i uniformly in B ∪C and this clearly cannot benefit agent i. Turning to SP−
we assume i likes Li and reports L
′
i = Li ∪ L+i instead. If j was putting some
load in L+i , she now loads only L
+
i , so she does not help i at all. If she was not
loading L+i at all, she may do so now, in which case some weight will be taken
uniformly from the set she was loading before: this cannot benefit i strictly.
Check PART∗. Fix a problem M , an agent i, and for every j ∈ Ni let
Bj be the set of outcomes agent j loads in problem M(−i). Set N+ = {j ∈
Ni|Bj ∩ Li 6= ∅} and N− = N(N+ ∪ i). Before participating agent i’s
utility was
1
n− 1
∑
j∈N+
λj where λj =
|Bj ∩ Li|
|Bj | .
After i shows up every j in N+ loads only Bj ∩ Li, and agents in N− may
give some of their load to Li therefore i’s utility is at least
1
n
(1 + |N+|). The
inequality
1
n− 1
∑
j∈N+
λj ≤ |N
+|
n− 1 ≤
1
n
(1 + |N+|).
proves PART. And both inequalities are equalities if and only if each λj = 1
and |N+| = n− 1⇔ N+ = Ni; the latter implies that i’s utility is already 1
in M(−i).
Example (1) above shows that both RP and CUT are inefficient. Under
the CUT rule agents 1, 2 and 5 load only d, while agent 3 spreads his load
between a and b, and agent 4 between a and c, resulting in the mixture zcut =
(15 ,
1
10 ,
1
10 ,
3
5 , 0). Under RP we get z
rp = (15 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
7
15 , 0); for instance b is selected
in two cases only: if 3 is first, and 5 comes before 4 (proba. 110 ), or 5 is first and
3 is first among 1, 2, 3 (proba. 115 ). As noted at the end of Section 3, shifting
the weight of b and c to a and d is a Pareto improvement. Clearly, then, zrp is
more inefficient than zcut.
In our next example, with n = 6 and |A| = 5,
N ↓ A→ a b c d e
1 1 0 0 1 0
2 1 0 0 0 1
3 0 1 0 1 0
4 0 1 0 0 1
5 0 0 1 1 0
6 0 0 1 0 1
(4)
the CUT rule selects the efficient mixture zcut = (0, 0, 0, 12 ,
1
2 ) and U
cut
i = 0.5
for all i, while RP picks zrp = (19 ,
1
9 ,
1
9 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) and U
rp
i = 0.44 for all i: thus z
cut
is strictly Pareto superior to zrp.
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The reverse situation cannot happen: the RP mixture never Pareto domi-
nates the CUT one. This follows because in all problems, total utility under RP
is at most that under CUT: U rpN ≤ U cutN . Indeed U cut is the uniform average
of profiles U(i) maximizing total utility in Φp(M ; i), and for each ordering σ
where i is first, the corresponding profile Uσ is in Φp(M ; i) as well.4
We prove finally that the CUT rule is efficient more often than RP : whenever
RP picks an efficient mixture, so does CUT. Observe first that both rules only
give weight to undominated pure outcomes. In the case of RP every such
outcome a has a positive weight, because it is selected whenever the set of
agents who like a has the highest priority. Thus the support of the RP mixture
is exactly the set of all undominated columns. Therefore RP selects an efficient
mixture if and only if all mixtures with support in this set are efficient as well.
The claim follows because the CUT rule is also a combination of undominated
columns.
The next result adds to the discussion above some worst case computations
reinforcing the strong efficiency advantage of CUT over RP.
Theorem 2
i) Both rules CUT and RP are strategyproof and meet Strict Participation and
Unanimity Fair Share.
ii) Total utility at the CUT mixture is never below that at the RP mixture, and
the former may Pareto dominate the latter. If RP picks an efficient mixture at
some problem M , so does CUT.
iii) The CUT rule is εcut(n)-efficient with εcut(n) = O(n−
1
3 ) and for all n ≥ 5
we have
εcut(n) ≥ 1
n
+ (1− 1
n
1
3
)
3
n
1
3
(5)
The RP rule is εrp(n)-efficient with εrp(n) ≤ O( ln(n)
n
).
iv) The CUT mixture is computed in time polynomial in n+ |A|; computing the
RP rule is #P-complete in n+ |A|.
Recall from the Lemma in Section 3 that both CUT and RP are efficient if
n ≤ 4. For small values of n, the lower bound (5) implies a high guaranteed
efficiency of CUT, a lower bound on εcut(n), and the computations in Step 2
of the proof below yield a much smaller worst case efficiency of RP, an upper
bound on εrp(n):
n 6 8 12 32 64 1024 16384
εcut ≥ 91% 87% 82% 68% 58% 27% 11%
εrp ≤ 83% 72% 64% 40% 24% 3% 0.12%
Together statements ii) to iv) make a very strong case that in our model the
CUT rule is a much more efficient interpretation of the random dictator idea
than RP.
Proof of statement iii) (Statement iv) is explained in Section 9)
4A consequence of this remark is that CUT and RP pick the same utility profile at problem
M if and only if all undominated outcomes of M are liked by the same number of agents.
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Step 1 Worst case inefficiency of CUT
Step 1.a: We construct a problem with large n where the CUT profile is
O(n−
1
3 ) inefficient. We fix N of size n, a partition N = N1∪N2, and an integer
p such that
p < n1, n2 and n1 divides (p− 1)n2 where ni = |Ni|, i = 1, 2.
Problem M has 2n2 + 1 outcomes labeled as A = {a} ∪ B ∪ C, where B =
{bj, j ∈ N2} and C = {cj, j ∈ N2}. Setting (p− 1)n2 = qn1, each agent i ∈ N1
likes a, exactly q outcomes in B, and none in C; and each j ∈ N2 dislikes a, likes
only outcome bj in B, and exactly p− 1 outcomes in C. Moreover the problem
is symmetric in N1 and in N2, which can be achieved by arranging cyclically
the like-sets of the N1 agents in B and the like-sets of the N2 agents in C. Here
is an example with n1 = n2 = 5, p = 4 and q = 3, and the top five agents form
N1:
a b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
Note that each outcome bj is liked by exactly p agents, all but one of them in
N1, and each cj is liked by exactly p− 1 agents, all in N2.
Under the CUT rule, each agent i ∈ N1 loads only a because n1 > p, so
za =
n1
n
, and each j ∈ N2 loads only bj so zbj = 1n ; there is no weight on C.
Total utility in each group is
UN1 =
(n1)
2
n
+
n2
n
(p− 1) ; UN2 =
n2
n
and by the symmetries these are equally shared in N1 and N2 respectively.
Now consider the mixture z′: z′a =
2
3 , z
′
cj
= 13n2 for all j ∈ N2, and zero
weight on B, resulting in the total utilities
U ′N1 =
2
3
n1 ; U
′
N2
=
1
3
(p− 1)
again equally shared in each Ni.
For n large enough we can pick n1 and p such that n1 ≃ n 23 and p− 1 ≃ n 13
(if n is a cube these values are exact and q = n
2
3 − n 13 ) so that n2
n
≃ 1. This
yields the ratios
U ′N1
UN1
≃
2
3n
2
3
2n
1
3
=
1
3
n
1
3 =
U ′N2
UN2
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and completes the proof of Step 1.a.
Step 1.b. For an arbitrary problem M we give an upper-bound of the ineffi-
ciency of the CUT mixture.
We fix a problem M and partition the agents according to their scores
maxU∈Φp(M ;i) UN , i.e., the utilitarian score of the outcomes on which they
spread their weight under the CUT rule. Let p1 > p2 > · · · > pK > 0 be
the sequence of such scores and Nk the subset of agents who load outcomes
with score pk. Note that n1 ≥ p1. Set Ak to be the set of outcomes loaded by at
least one agent in Nk: they all have the same score pk so the Ak-s are pairwise
disjoint. Note also that agents in Nk do not like any outcome in Aℓ for ℓ < k.
Consider finally the outcomes b in B = A(∪K1 Ak), if any. Their utilitarian
score uNb is at most p1−1. We partition B by gathering in Bk all the outcomes
with a score in [pk+1, pk], with the convention pK+1 = 0. Therefore the agents
in Nk do not like any outcome in Bℓ for ℓ < k.
We prove first that for any feasible profile U ∈ Φ(M), we can find convex
weights π1, · · · , πK such that
UNk ≤ πkpk for k = 1, · · · ,K (6)
Pick z ∈ ∆(A) implementing U and write for simplicity zAk = xk and zBk = yk.
The total contribution5 UNAk = xkpk of Ak to UN is shared between the agents
of ∪k1Nℓ only, so there are some convex weights γkℓ , 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, such that
UNℓAk = γ
k
ℓxkpk for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k ≤ K.
Similarly the contribution UNBk of Bk is shared in ∪k1Nℓ and UNBk ≤ ykpk. So
we can find convex weights δkℓ , 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, such that
UNℓBk ≤ δkℓ ykpk for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k ≤ K.
Combining the above equality and inequality we have for all k
UNk =
K∑
ℓ=k
(UNkAℓ + UNkBℓ) ≤
K∑
ℓ=k
(γℓkxℓ + δ
ℓ
kyℓ)pℓ ≤ pk
K∑
ℓ=k
(γℓkxℓ + δ
ℓ
kyℓ)
so the weights πk =
∑K
ℓ=k(γ
ℓ
kxℓ + δ
ℓ
kyℓ) are indeed convex and satisfy (6).
Next we evaluate the blocks of the profile U cut in the same fashion. Agents
in Nk load exclusively Ak therefore if z implement U
cut we have zAk =
nk
n
and
U cutNAk =
nk
n
pk. We can find as above convex weights θ
k
ℓ , 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, such that
U cutNℓAk = θ
k
ℓ
nk
n
pk for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k ≤ K
and then as above we get
U cutNk =
K∑
ℓ=k
θℓk
nℓ
n
pℓ.
5Recall our notation uSB =
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈B uia.
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Assume now the profile U cut is ε-efficient: U cut ≤ εU for some feasible U .
From (6) we find convex weights π such that U cutNk ≤ επkpk for all k, which
implies
ε ≥
K∑
k=1
1
pk
U cutNk =
K∑
ℓ=1
nℓ
n
ℓ∑
k=1
θℓk
pℓ
pk
.
The key inequality is U cutNkAk ≥ nkn because agent i ∈ Nk loads only Ak
containing his like-set: this implies θkk ≥ 1pk . Moreover in the sum
∑ℓ
k=1 θ
ℓ
k
pℓ
pk
the terms pℓ
pk
increase in k. Combining these two observations we have for any
ℓ ≥ 2:
ℓ∑
k=1
θℓk
pℓ
pk
≥ (
ℓ−1∑
k=1
θℓk)
pℓ
p1
+ θℓℓ ≥ (1−
1
pℓ
)
pℓ
p1
+
1
pℓ
=
pℓ − 1
p1
+
1
pℓ
.
We invoke now the inequality α−1
p1
+ 1
α
≥ 2√
p1
− 1
p1
, for any α > 0, that we apply
to each α = pℓ, ℓ ≥ 2, and combine with the two inequalities above as well as
θ11 = 1:
ε ≥ n1
n
+ (1 − n1
n
)(
2√
p1
− 1
p1
).
Finally the term 2√
p1
− 1
p1
decreases in p1 and we know p1 ≤ n1, so we get
ε ≥ 1
n
(n1 + (n− n1)( 2√
n1
− 1
n1
)).
It remains to compute the minimum of the above expression for fixed n and
variable n1 ∈ [1, n]. With the real variable x instead of n1 the right hand term
and its derivative are
ϕ(x) =
1
n
(1 + x− 2√x) + ( 2√
x
− 1
x
) =⇒ ϕ′(x) = (1− 1√
x
)(
1
n
− 1
x
3
2
).
therefore x = n
2
3 achieves the minimum and we compute
ε ≥ ϕ(n 23 ) = 1
n
+ (1− 1
n
1
3
)
3
n
1
3
.
which is inequality (5).
Step 2: Lower bounding the worst case inefficiency of RP
Fix N and integers k, d, ℓ such that n = kd and 2 ≤ ℓ < k. Fix a partition
N1 ∪ · · · ∪ Nd of N where each subset contains k agents. This construction
requires n ≥ 6 and is not feasible for all n.
We consider the problem with A = D ∪ C where D = {1, · · · , d} and each
δ ∈ D is liked exactly by the k agents in N δ; also |C| = (n
ℓ
)
and each outcome
in C is liked exactly by a different subset of ℓ agents.
The symmetric (egalitarian) and efficient outcome is the uniform distribution
in D and yields the utility profile U∗i =
1
d
for all i. We compute now the
symmetric profile U implemented by RP.
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Fix an ordering σ ∈ Θ(N) and let L be the set of its ℓ highest priority
agents. In the resulting profile Uσ, the first ℓ agents have full utility (because
there is a ∈ C where they all do). Two cases arise. In the favourable case L
is contained in some set N δ: then δ is the only efficient pure outcome liked by
all agents in L, thus it must be chosen by the σ-priority rule and UσN = k. In
the unfavourable case L straddles two or more sets N δ and there is only one
outcome (in C) that everyone in L like, so that UσN = ℓ. Therefore
UN =
d
(
k
ℓ
)
(
n
ℓ
) · k + (1− d
(
k
ℓ
)
(
n
ℓ
) k) · ℓ = (k − ℓ)n
k
(
k
ℓ
)
(
n
ℓ
) + ℓ.
=⇒ ε(n) ≤ UN
U∗N
= (1 − ℓ
k
)
(k − 1) · · · (k − ℓ+ 1)
(n− 1) · · · (n− ℓ+ 1) +
ℓ
k
(7)
For the asymptotic statement we use the inequality
(kℓ)
(nℓ)
≤ ( k
n
)ℓ and compute
⇒ Ui
U ′i
=
UN
U ′N
≤ (k
n
)ℓ−1 +
ℓ
k
.
Then we choose k ≃ n
e
and ℓ ≃ ln(n) so that ( k
n
)ℓ−1+ ℓ
k
≃ e ln(n)
n
. The systematic
inequality εrp(n) ≤ 6 ln(n)
n
is obtained by numerical estimations of (7), omitted
for brevity.
Remark 2 The proof of Step 2 improves upon, with a similar proof technique,
Example 1 in (Bogomolnaia et al., 2002) establishing that RP is 2√
n
inefficient.
7 Efficiency and Fairness; the Nash Max Prod-
uct rule
Our last rule of interest is a familiar compromise between the Utilitarian and
Egalitarian rules:
Nash Max Product rule (NMP): Fnsh(M) = arg max
U∈Φ(M)
∑
i∈N
lnUi.
This rule is well defined because it solves a strictly convex program, and obvi-
ously efficient.
Recall that Unanimity Fair Share offers welfare guarantees only to coalitions
of agents with identical preferences (clones). The first of our two new “Fair
Share” axioms applies, much more generally, to any group who can find at least
one outcome that everyone likes:
Average Fair Share (AFS)
for all S ⊆ N : {∃a ∈ A : uia = 1 for all i ∈ S} =⇒ 1|S|US ≥
|S|
n
.
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The next property conveys the idea that, as each agent is endowed with 1/n-th
of total decision power, any coalition of size s can cumulate these shares and
impose that a mixture of their choice be chosen with probability at least s
n
:
Core Fair Share (CFS)
for all S ⊆ N : ∄z ∈ ∆(A) s. t. ∀i ∈ S, Ui ≤ |S|
n
(ui ·z) and ∃i, Ui < |S|
n
(ui ·z)..
This is a familiar core stability property.
That UFS follows from either AFS or CFS is clear because we only consider
anonymous rules. Applying CFS to S = N implies that the rule is efficient,
therefore neither the CUT or the RP rule meets CFS. In the example (1) it
happens that the AFS property selects uniquely the Nash mixture,6 therefore
CUT and RP fail AFS as well.
We illustrate the bite of AFS in the following example
a b c d
1 1 0 0 0
2 1 1 1 0
3 0 0 1 1
4 0 1 0 1
5 0 0 0 1
For a mixture z = (α, β, γ, δ) we apply AFS to S = {1, 2} and T = {3, 4, 5}
2α+ β + γ ≥ 4
5
; β + γ + 3δ ≥ 9
5
.
Adding both inequalities gives δ ≥ 35 , then the first one implies α ≥ 25 so that
z = (25 , 0, 0,
3
5 ): this is precisely the mixture selected by the NMP rule. Clearly
z meets CFS as well.
By contrast Core Fair Share selects many more outcomes than the Nash
mixture, for instance z′ = (15 ,
3
20 ,
3
20 ,
1
2 ). So in this example AFS is more de-
manding than CFS, but in general the two axioms are not logically related. For
instance in the problem
1 1 0 0
2 1 1 0
3 0 1 0
4 0 0 1
the mixture z = ( 720 ,
7
20 ,
3
10 ) gives the profile U = (
7
20 ,
7
10 ,
7
20 ,
3
10 ). It passes the
AFS test but fails CFS because coalition {1, 2, 3} achieves utilities (38 , 34 , 38 ) by
implementing 34 of the mixture z
′ = (12 ,
1
2 , 0), and they all improve strictly.
Theorem 3
i) The NMP rule is efficient and meets Strict Participation, Average Fair Share,
and Core Fair Share.
6We leave the proof to the reader and give a similar example in the next paragraph.
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ii) The NMP rule is not Excludable Strategyproof.
Proof
Step 1: We prove AFS and CFS.
The separation inequality capturing the optimality of the Nash utility profile
U∗ = Fnsh(M) at problem M writes as follows:
∑
i∈N
Ui
U∗i
≤
∑
i∈N
U∗i
U∗i
= n for all U ∈ Φ(M) (8)
Fix S ⊆ N and combine (8) with Cauchy’s inequality as follows
nU∗S ≥ (
∑
i∈S
Ui
U∗i
).(
∑
i∈S
U∗i )≥(
∑
i∈S
√
Ui)
2
=⇒
U∗S ≥
1
n
max
U∈Φ(M)
(
∑
i∈S
√
Ui)
2
(9)
The AFS property follows, because if there is some a ∈ A such that uia = 1 for
all i ∈ S, the maximum on the right hand side is |S|2. To check CFS we assume
there is a mixture z such that U∗i ≤ |S|n (ui · z) for all i ∈ S and use again (8) to
compute:
n ≥
∑
i∈S
ui · z
U∗i
≥ n|S|
∑
i∈S
U∗i
U∗i
= n
therefore none of the inequalities U∗i ≤ |S|n (ui · z) can be strict.
Step 2 : We check PART ∗.
In a preliminary result we fix S ⊂ RN+ convex and compact, and write S(−1)
for its projection on RN1+ . Define
U∗ = argmax
U∈S
∑
i∈N
ln(Ui)
U−1 = arg max
U−1∈S(−1)
∑
i∈N1
ln(Ui) and U1 = max
(U1,U−1)∈S
U1.
Inequality U∗1 < U1 brings a contradiction as follows∑
i∈N
ln(U i) ≥ ln(U1) +
∑
i∈N{1}
ln(U∗i ) >
∑
i∈N
ln(U∗i ).
Assume next U∗1 = U1. The right hand inequality above becomes an equality,
so we get
∑
i∈N ln(U i) =
∑
i∈N ln(U
∗
i ) and finally U = U
∗. Summing up, we
have just proven:
U∗1 ≥ U1; and if U∗1 = U1 then U∗−1 = U−1 (10)
Applying (10) to S = Φ(M), U∗ = Fnsh(M), U−1 = Fnsh(M(−1)) gives
U1 = U1(−1) and U∗1 ≥ U1, the first inequality in PART∗ (i.e., PART). To check
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the second we can assume that any two columns of u are different, for if two
columns are identical one of them can be eliminated as a redundant outcome.
Also recall that no row of u is null.
Because U∗i > 0 for all i, the statement is true if U1 = 0. We assume
now 0 < U∗1 = U1 < 1 and derive a contradiction. Property (10) implies
U∗ = U , therefore there is some z ∈ ∆(A) solving both problems: z ∈ fnsh(M)∩
fnsh(M(− 1)).
As 0 < U∗1 < 1 the mixture z cannot be deterministic, moreover there exists
two outcomes a, b in the support [z] of z such that u1a = 1, u1b = 0. Writing
N(x; y) for the set of agents inN who like x and dislike y, this means 1 ∈ N(a; b).
Note that N(b; a) must contain at least one i ∈ N1: otherwise the column
Ua dominates column Ub (outcome b is Pareto inferior to a) which contradicts
the efficiency of z in M . We claim that N(a; b) as well contains some j ∈
N1: suppose not, then the restriction of column Ub to N1 either dominates
the corresponding restriction of Ua, or these two restricted columns are equal;
the former case contradicts efficiency of z in M(−1), the latter contradicts its
efficiency in M .
We have shown that N(a; b) and N(b; a) both contains at least one outcome
in N1. Recalling that za, zb are both positive, we define z(ε) by shifting the
weight ε from a to b: this outcome is well defined for ε small enough and of
arbitrary sign; such a shift does not affect agents outside N(a; b)∪N(b; a). From
z ∈ fnsh(M(− 1)) we see that the strictly concave function
ϕ(ε) =
∑
i∈(N(a;b)∪N(b;a))1
ln(ui · z(ε)).
reaches its maximum at ε = 0. And z ∈ fnsh(M) implies that the function
ϕ(ε) + ln(u1 · z(ε)) is also maximal at ε = 0: this is a contradiction because
ln(u1 · z(ε)) decreases strictly in ε.
The proof that the NMP rule fails EXSP is more involved and relegated to
the Appendix. There we construct an example with |A| = 4 and n = 860 where
it violates the SP+ property. We also report a computer generated example with
36 agents proving the same point. This prompts the following open question:
what are the smallest sizes of |N |, |A| ensuring that NMP violates EXSP ?
Remark 3. Another version of the group fair share requirement is proposed
by Bogomolnaia et al. (2002). The same concept was independently proposed
by Duddy (2015) who referred to simply as proportional share (Duddy, 2015).
For the sake of consistency with our other notions, we will refer to it as Group
Fair Share(GFS).
Writing u∗S for the maximum of all utility functions in S (u∗Sa = maxi∈S uia),
this condition is
U∗S ≥ |S|
n
for all S.
It is clearly stronger than UFS, but strictly weaker than CFS. Both CUT and
RP satisfy GFS.
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Remark 4. It has been mentioned as an open problem, in the more general
voting model with vNM-preferences, whether there exists some rule that satis-
fies Very Strong Stochastic Dominance Participation and Stochastic Dominance
Efficiency for weak orders (Brandl et al., 2015; Brandt, 2017). Because NMP
satisfies both Strict Participation and Efficiency, we see that this question is
resolved at least for the case of dichotomous preferences.
8 Decentralization
We introduce a Decentralization (DEC) property for polarized societies. Say
the agents and the deterministic outcomes are color-coded with the same set of
colors: we call a profile of preferences polarized if each agent only likes outcomes
of his own color. The requirement is that if I am red, the number of green agents
will matter to me but not their preferences inside green outcomes. This natural
independence property adds to the appeal of the NMP rule, but also of the CUT
and RP rules.
Consider a problem M = (N,A, u) and two partitions Γ = (Nk)Kk=1 and
Λ = (Ak)Kk=1 of N and A respectively. We call this problem polarized along the
partitions Γ,Λ if uia = 0 whenever i ∈ Nk, a ∈ Ak, and k 6= k′. Then if uk is
the restriction of u to Nk × Ak, problem M is captured by its K subproblems
Mk = (Nk, Ak, uk). We write Π(Γ,Λ) the set of polarized problems.
Decentralization (DEC): for any Γ,Λ and k
{M,M ′ ∈ Π(Γ,Λ) and uia = u′ia if i ∈ Nk, a ∈ Ak} =⇒ Fi(M) = Fi(M ′) for i ∈ Nk.
Combined with the UFS property, this implies that in a polarized problem, each
colored subset Nk chooses the distribution in ∆(Ak) as if other colors were not
present, then the selected outcome in f(Mk) is weighted down in proportion of
the size of Nk.
Proposition The Nash, Conditional Utilitarian, and Random Priority rules
meet Decentralization. Moreover for any polarized problem M ∈ Π(Γ,Λ) they
satisfy
F (M) =
K∑
k=1
|Nk|
n
F (Mk) (11)
where the profile F (Mk) is filled with zeros outside Mk.
Check that the Utilitarian and Egalitarian rules violate DEC. Consider the two
polarized problems along the partition {1} ∪ (2, 3}:
M :
1 1 0 0
2 0 1 0
3 0 0 1
M ′ :
1 1 0 0
2 0 1 0
3 0 1 1
.
Both UTIL and EGAL choose z = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) at M , but at M
′ they pick respec-
tively z′ = (0, 1, 0) and z′′ = (12 ,
1
2 , 0), in contradiction of DEC.
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Proof of Proposition
Step 1. NMP meets DEC
We prove it for two partitions Γ = (N1, N2) and Λ = (A1, A2) as the general
case with arbitrary K is just as easy. We fix a problem M ∈ Π(Γ,Λ) with the
two subproblemsMk = (Nk, Ak, uk), k = 1, 2: there is no null row in uk because
there is none in the grand matrix u. Let z∗ ∈ fN(M) be (one of) NMP’s choice
in M . By IFS both weights z∗A1 = λ1 and z
∗
A2
= λ2 are strictly positive (and
sum to 1). By definition (12) the restriction z∗(Ak) of z∗ to Ak solves
max
z˜≥0,z˜
Ak
=λk
∑
i∈Nk
ln(ui · z˜).
Changing the variables z˜ to z = 1
λk
z˜, we see that 1
λk
z∗(Ak) solves
max
z∈∆(Ak)
∑
i∈Nk
ln(ui · λz) = nk lnλk + max
z∈∆(Ak)
∑
i∈Nk
ln(ui · z)
therefore z∗(Ak) = λkzk, where zk ∈ fN (Mk), and
max
z˜≥0,z˜
Ak
=λk
∑
i∈Nk
ln(ui · z˜) = nk lnλk +
∑
i∈Nk
lnFNi (M
k).
It is now clear that the optimal choice of λ1, λ2 is
(λ1, λ2) = arg max
λ1+λ2=1
{n1 lnλ1 + n2 lnλ2} = (n1
n
,
n2
n
).
In particular λ depends only on the sizes of the partition sets, and U∗i =
nk
n
FNi (M
k) for each i ∈ Nk, the desired property (11).
Step 2 CUT and RP meet DEC
Fix M ∈ Π(Γ,Λ) some k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K and some i ∈ Nk. Under the CUT
rule only the agents in Nk will load the outcomes that i likes, and they will do
it exactly as in the problem Mk, except that each j ∈ Nk will spread a total
weight of 1
n
instead of 1
nk
. This implies (11). The proof for RP is just as easy.

9 Computation
In this section we first discuss the computational aspects of the rules we have
considered in the paper. We then report on some experiments where we exam-
ined the utilitarian performance of the four rules, which in turn gives a lower
bound on their efficiency.
1. Computational complexity
The CUT rule is the easiest to compute of the four. In the like-set of each
agent we simply need to identify those liked by the largest number of other
agents.
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For EGAL, the outcome can be computed in polynomial-time by solving at
most n+1 linear programs each with |A| variables. The algorithm was presented
by Aziz and Stursberg (2014).
The RP outcome is #P-complete to compute even under dichotomous pref-
erences (Aziz et al., 2013). Therefore unless P=NP, it is unlikely that there
exists an efficient algorithm for computing the RP outcome. For RP, it is even
open whether there exists an FPRAS (Fully Polynomial-time Approximation
Scheme) for computing the outcome shares/probabilities.
As for NMP, in contrast to RP, an approximate solution can be computed
relatively fast by using general optimisation packages and solvers. The problem
is to maximize a convex objective
∑
i∈N log(ui ·z) where z is a feasible mixture.
Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) discussed some standard approaches to approximate
the solution.
2. Experiments
We ran some experiments for small numbers of agents and outcomes. It
is difficult to evaluate in a given problem the degree of inefficiency of a given
mixture z as in Definition 1, iii). However the ratio of utilitarian welfare at z
to the maximum utilitarian welfare gives a lower bound on ε, and it is much
easier to compute.
For each combination of n and |A| in {3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20} and for each rule,
we examined under the impartial culture (1) the minimum of this ratio and (2)
its average. The results are listed in Tables 1–8. For RP, we did not run the
experiments for n = 15 and 20 because the computation becomes very slow.
This illustrates the computational infeasibility of RP when we want the exact
mixture, even for a relatively modest number of agents.
As the number of agents increase, the ratios start to get worse. But for a
fixed number of agents, the ratios do not necessarily get worse as we increase
the number of alternatives. We note that CUT seems to fare marginally but
consistently better than NMP, RP, and EGAL in the utilitarian metric. This is
especially so when we consider the average rather than the worst ratios.
We note that NMP rule’s fairness constraints also lead to loss of utilitarian
welfare. Fain et al. (2016) show that on certain real-world participatory bud-
geting datasets, core fair outcomes often coincide with welfare maximizing ones.
Since the objective of EGAL is diametrically opposed to utilitarian objectives,
it is not surprising that EGAL fares the worst in the utilitarian metric among
the rules we consider. In particular its worst case ratios drop rapidly as we
increase the number of agents and outcomes.
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|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.8314 0.8155 0.8069 0.8005 0.781 0.7149
5 0.7777 0.7778 0.7322 0.7531 0.7072 0.7172
7 0.7678 0.80790 0.7373 0.695 0.7581 0.7109
10 0.7524 0.7334 0.808 0.7843 0.7857 0.7204
15 0.7862 0.8029 0.7561 0.7801 0.7747 0.7737
20 0.792 0.8234 0.7764 0.8155 0.7505 0.7896
Table 1: Minimum ratio of utilitarian welfare under the NMP rule to maximum
utilitarian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for
each combination of # agents and # outcomes.
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.9451 0.9652 0.9722 0.9678 0.9759 0.9634
5 0.9171 0.9309 0.9421 0.9377 0.9335 0.9004
7 0.8926 0.9324 0.9171 0.9277 0.9121 0.8856
10 0.8921 0.9014 0.91 0.9094 0.9056 0.8873
15 0.893 0.9013 0.8911 0.9049 0.8984 0.8774
20 0.8948 0.9001 0.8909 0.9047 0.9049 0.8941
Table 2: Average ratio of utilitarian welfare the NMP rule to maximum utilitar-
ian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each
combination of # agents and # outcomes.
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.75 0.6397 0.5333 0.4815 0.4333 0.3743
5 0.625 0.3919 0.4244 0.4592 0.4956 0.403
7 0.5833 0.492 0.3632 0.5102 0.5599 0.5799
10 0.5834 0.375 0.4952 0.4253 0.5689 0.5696
15 0.5129 0.5525 0.57 0.4361 0.5198 0.5817
20 0.6001 0.625 0.5927 0.5525 0.6425 0.5656
Table 3: Minimum ratio of utilitarian welfare under EGAL to maximum utili-
tarian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each
combination of # agents and # outcomes.
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.9325 0.9256 0.8838 0.8075 0.844 0.8408
5 0.8482 0.8484 0.781 0.8019 0.82 0.8175
7 0.8221 0.8131 0.7817 0.7978 0.7992 0.8118
10 0.8176 0.8049 0.7902 0.7639 0.8152 0.7803
15 0.8267 0.807 0.7805 0.7476 0.8259 0.8009
20 0.8414 0.8278 0.8121 0.7748 0.8265 0.8084
Table 4: Average ratio of utilitarian welfare under EGAL to maximum utilitar-
ian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each
combination of # agents and # outcomes.
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|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333
5 0.8 0.7333 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8667
7 0.75 0.7619 0.8571 0.8214 0.8857 0.8571
10 0.8 0.8 0.8714 0.86 0.8667 0.8833
15 0.8 0.8444 0.8583 0.8417 0.8741 0.8815
20 0.8038 0.85 0.8773 0.9 0.8944 0.8727
Table 5: Minimum ratio of utilitarian welfare under CUT to maximum utilitar-
ian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each
combination of # agents and # outcomes.
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.9333 0.9717 0.9717 0.9867 0.9867 0.995
5 0.9372 0.9452 0.959 0.9748 0.969 0.9757
7 0.9139 0.9468 0.9549 0.9624 0.969 0.9778
10 0.9194 0.9383 0.9502 0.9586 0.9576 0.965
15 0.9263 0.9276 0.9483 0.9483 0.9567 0.9634
20 0.9195 0.9332 0.9486 0.955 0.9588 0.9631
Table 6: Average ratio of utilitarian welfare under CUT to maximum utilitar-
ian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each
combination of # agents and # outcomes.
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333
5 0.7778 0.7 0.7778 0.7778 0.7 0.8
7 0.7679 0.75 0.8036 0.75 0.7943 0.7778
10 0.7778 0.7737 0.7596 0.8116 0.7684 0.8031
Table 7: Minimum ratio of utilitarian welfare under RP to maximum utilitar-
ian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each
combination of # agents and # outcomes.
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.9483 0.9733 0.9883 0.99 0.9867 0.9933
5 0.8992 0.9302 0.9351 0.9471 0.9512 0.962
7 0.8851 0.8952 0.9143 0.9182 0.929 0.9305
10 0.8839 0.89 0.8911 0.8969 0.9 0.8997
Table 8: Average ratio of utilitarian welfare under RP to maximum utilitar-
ian welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each
combination of # agents and # outcomes.
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10 Conclusion and Open Questions
1) We compared the relative merits of some well-known rules (EGAL, RP, NMP)
and of an (essentially) new one (CUT), for the model of probabilistic/fractional
voting under dichotomous preferences. We did so by taking a more nuanced and
fine-grained approach to standard concepts such as strategyproofness, partici-
pation incentives, and welfare guarantees, of which we introduced new versions,
both weaker and stronger than the existing ones. Some of the results are sum-
marised in Table 9.
RP CUT UTIL EGAL NMP
Properties
EFF (Efficiency) – – + + +
EXSP = SP− ∧ SP+ (Excludable SP) + + + + –
SP = SP∗ ∧ SP+ (Strategyproofness) + + + – –
IFS (Individual Fair Share) + + – + +
GFS (Group Fair Share) + + – – +
AFS (Avg. Fair Share) – – – – +
CFS (Core Fair Share) – – – – +
PART (Participation) + + + + +
PART∗ (Strict participation) + + – – +
DEC (Decentralisation) + + – – +
Known Polynomial-time Algorithm – + + + –
Table 9: Properties satisfied by rules under dichotomous preferences.
The two rules that are especially desirable in the instances where protection
of minorities and participation concerns matter most are CUT and NMP. The
Conditional Utilitarian rule is strongly incentive compatible, but in extreme
cases it may be severely inefficient. The Nash Max Product rule is efficient and
gives much better guarantees to groups of agents than CUT, but it fails even
the weak form of strategyproofness where outcomes are excludable.
2) Our results also identify two especially interesting open questions. We
know from Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) that Efficiency, Individual Fair Share and
Strategyproofness are incompatible. If we are content to achieve only the ex-
cludable version of Strategyproofness, this incompatibility disappears, and the
Egalitarian rule is an example. The unpalatable feature of this rule is that
it pays no attention to clones (subgroups of agents with identical preferences)
hence offers no protection to sizable minorities. But can a rule combine Ef-
ficiency, Excludable Strategyproofness and Strict Participation; or Efficiency,
Excludable Strategyproofness and Unanimous Fair Share? Such a rule would
be a serious new contender in our fair mixing model.
3) Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) defined, and Bogomolnaia et al. (2002) studied,
a family of welfarist rules directly borrowed from classical social choice theory.
Fix an increasing, strictly concave, and continuous function h on [0.1]. A rule
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in the sense of Definition 1 is obtained by maximizing the sum of individual
utilities weighted by h:
h-rule: f(M) = arg max
U∈Φ(M)
∑
i∈N
h(Ui) (12)
This maximization has a unique solution in Φ(M). The NMP rule is of course
a paramount example.
All h-rules are efficient, and by mimicking Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 3,
we see that they satisfy PART∗ provided h′(0) = ∞. They satisfy (resp. fail)
IFS if h is at least as concave as (resp. less concave than) the log function;
but NMP is the only h-rule meeting UFS (these two facts are already proven in
Bogomolnaia et al. (2002)). Finally all h-rules fail EXSP and only NMP meets
DEC. Thus they don’t add much to our axiomatic discussion.
However, once we observe that the EGAL and UTIL rules are the two end
points of the family of h-rules7 the following intriguing facts emerges: most
h-rules meet PART∗ but neither EGAL nor UTIL does; EGAL and UTIL meet
EXSP, but none of the h-rules does.
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12 Appendix
12.1 The NMP rule fails EXSP
12.1.1 A numerical example
Consider the following example with 36 agents and 4 outcomes.
a b c d
No. of agents types
4 1 0 0 0
4 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1
2 1 1 1 0
2 1 1 0 1
7 1 0 1 0
7 1 0 0 1
4 0 1 1 0
4 0 1 0 1
The outcome of NMP is (0.4163514575435199, 0.08787730532715962,
0.2479123840667547, 0.24785885306256383). If one agent of type one addition-
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ally liked b, the profile is as follows.
a b c d
No. of agents types
3 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
4 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1
2 1 1 1 0
2 1 1 0 1
7 1 0 1 0
7 1 0 0 1
4 0 1 1 0
4 0 1 0 1
In this case, The outcome of NMP is 0.4179621510380684, 0.1389580435629242,
0.22150747720884034, 0.22157232819017458). Note that the misreporting agent
gets more utility (equivalently more probability for outcome a by additionally
liking b).
12.1.2 A formal construction
We fix N and A and describe a profile u ∈ Ω by the vector (nS)S∈2A∅ of
non negative integers, where nS is the number of agents i with like-set Li = S.
Because fnsh is Anonymous, this is all we need to describe fnsh(u). If z ∈ ∆(A)
has full support (za > 0 for all a), it is (uniquely) selected at u if and only if
the gradient of z → ϕ(z) = ∑N ln(zLi) is parallel at z to 1A. Write Θ(a) for
the set of subsets of A containing a, then we have
∂ϕ
∂za
(z) =
∑
i:a∈Li
1
zLi
=
∑
S∈Θ(a)
nS
zS
so if Θ(a− b) is the set of coalitions containing a and not b, and Sc is AS, we
have
∂ϕ
∂za
(z) =
∂ϕ
∂zb
(z)⇐⇒
∑
S∈Θ(a−b)
(
nS
zS
− nSc
zSc
) = 0 (13)
Thus fnsh(u) = z holds iff the right hand equation above holds for |A| − 1
independent pairs a, b.
Constructing an example violating SP+ We note first that SP+ is equiv-
alent to the following property: if at profile u a set of K agents have identical
preferences S, and u′ is obtained from u when they all report instead S ∪ T ,
ceteris paribus, then the total weight of S decreases weakly from u to u′. In-
deed by SP+, when our K agents misreport their preferences one at a time, the
weight of a must decrease weakly at each step.
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We fix now A = {a, b, c1, c2} and two mixtures z, z′ ∈ ∆(A), both symmetric
in c1, c2 and such that
0 < za < z
′
a , 0 < zb < z
′
b , zc > z
′
c > 0 (14)
(where zc stands for zc1 = zc2). We show that, under some additional restric-
tions on z, z′ we can choose u ∈ Ω and an integer K such that fnsh(u) = z and
fnsh(u′) = z′, where u′ is obtained from u when K agents of type a switch to
ab. This contradicts SP+.
The profile u is symmetric in c1, c2 and we write nac in lieu of nac1 etc..Then
ϕ(u) = z holds iff the two equations (13) applied respectively to a, c1 and to b,
c1, are true: note that (13) for c1, c2 is obtained by the symmetry assumption.
These two equations are
(
na
za
− nbcc
zbcc
) + (
nab
zab
− ncc
zcc
) + (
nac2
zac2
− nbc1
zbc1
) + (
nabc2
zabc2
− nc1
zc1
) = 0 (15)
(
nb
zb
− nacc
zacc
) + (
nab
zab
− ncc
zcc
) + (
nbc2
zbc2
− nac1
zac1
) + (
nabc2
zabc2
− nc1
zc1
) = 0 (16)
We choose u in such a way that all parenthesis above are null, that is we
pick five positive parameters α, β, γ, δ, ε, such that
na
za
=
nbcc
zbcc
= αK ;
nb
zb
=
nacc
zacc
= βK ;
nc
zc
=
nabc
zabc
= γK (17)
nab
zab
=
ncc
zcc
= δK ;
nac
zac
=
nbc
zbc
= εK (18)
Note that we must have na ≥ K ⇐⇒ α ≥ 1za in order to construct u′ by
transforming K agents who only like {a} to agents who like a and b. And if
the coordinates of z and the numbers α, · · · , ε are all rational, we can choose K
large enough so that the above system delivers integers nS for all S.
The profile u′ has n′a = na −K and n′ab = nab +K, and other terms nS are
as in u. The desired equality fnsh(u′) = z′ requires two equations like (15) and
(16). For instance (15) becomes
(
na
z′a
− nbcc
z′bcc
) + (
nab
z′ab
− ncc
z′cc
) + (
nac
z′ac
− nbc
z′bc
) + (
nabc
z′abc
− nc
z′c
) = K(
1
z′a
− 1
z′ab
).
Taking (17), (18) into account this becomes
(
za
z′a
− zbcc
z′bcc
)α+ (
zab
z′ab
− zcc
z′cc
)δ + (
zac
z′ac
− zbc
z′bc
)ε+ (
zabc
z′abc
− zc
z′c
)γ =
1
z′a
− 1
z′ab
.
⇐⇒ za − z
′
a
z′a · (1− z′a)
·α+ zab − z
′
ab
z′ab · (1− z′ab)
·δ+ zac − z
′
ac
z′ac · (1 − z′ac)
·ε+ z
′
c − zc
z′c · (1− z′c)
·γ = z
′
b
z′a · z′ab
.
Now we use inequalities (14) to check that in the above sum, all numerators
except zac−z′ac are negative. Therefore zac−z′ac is positive and we can rewrite
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this equation as
zac − z′ac
z′ac · (1− z′ac)
·ε = z
′
b
z′a · z′ab
+
zc − z′c
z′c · (1− z′c)
·γ+ z
′
a − za
z′a · (1− z′a)
·α+ z
′
ab − zab
z′ab · (1− z′ab)
·δ
(19)
where all fractions are positive on both sides.
The second equation we need to ensure fnsh(u′) = z′ is the counterpart of
(16) and reads
(
nb
z′b
− nacc
z′acc
) + (
nab
z′ab
− ncc
z′cc
) + (
nbc
z′bc
− nac
z′ac
) + (
nabc
z′abc
− nc
z′c
) +
K
z′ab
= 0.
A similar computation using (17), (18) to change the terms nS into zS and
inequalities (14) to sign the fractions gives
1
z′ab
=
z′b − zb
z′b · (1− z′b)
·β+ z
′
ab − zab
z′ab · (1− z′ab)
·δ+ zac − z
′
ac
z′ac · (1− z′ac)
·ε+ zc − z
′
c
z′c · (1− z′c)
·γ (20)
where again all ratios are positive.
We must show that the non negative rational numbers α, · · · , ε can be chosen
solving system (19), (20) and α ≥ 1
za
. Note that (19) implies
zac − z′ac
z′ac · (1− z′ac)
· ε > z
′
b
z′a · z′ab
+
z′a − za
z′a · (1− z′a)
· 1
za
and (20) gives
zac − z′ac
z′ac · (1 − z′ac)
· ε < 1
z′ab
We can choose ε meeting these two inequalities if and only if
z′b
z′a · z′ab
+
z′a − za
z′a · (1 − z′a)
· 1
za
<
1
z′ab
⇐⇒ z
′
a − za
za · (1− z′a)
<
z′a − z′b
z′ab
⇐⇒ za > z
′
a + z
′
b
2− z′a + z′b
. (21)
and in this case we can also pick α ≥ 1
za
as well as β, γ, δ solving (19), (20).
Summing up the requirements on z, z′: we need inequalities (14), (21) as
well as z′ac < zac ⇐⇒ z′a − z′b < za − zb. Note that (21) and z′a > za together
imply z′a > z
′
b. We can construct such a pair z, z
′ as follows.
Write r the RHS in (21), and check r < z′a as long as so z
′
a > z
′
b. Thus it is
enough to pick za in the interval ]max{r, z′a− z′b}, z′a[, and then to pick zb small
enough that z′a − z′b < za − zb.
For instance we can choose
za =
9
20
, zb =
1
20
, zc = zc′ =
1
4
; z′a =
1
2
, z′b = z
′
c = z
′
c′ =
1
6
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the system (19), (20) is then
3
20
ε =
1
2
+
3
5
γ +
3
4
δ +
1
5
α
3
5
γ +
3
20
ε+
21
25
β +
3
4
δ =
3
2
where we recall the constraint na ≥ K ⇔ 920α ≥ 1.
A relatively simple solution of the system above is
α =
25
11
, γ =
5
11
, ε =
90
11
, β = δ = 0
for which we derive the profile u ∈ ⊗ by system (17), (18). Here K = 44 is the
smallest integer delivering integer coordinates, and we end up with 860 agents
and the profile
na = 45, nbcc′ = 55 ; nc = nc′ = 5, nabc = nabc′ = 15 ; nac = nac′ = 252;
nbc = nbc′ = 108.
Example where the NMP rule violates (a slightly stronger version
of) SP 0 We use the same technique. Set A = {a, a′, a′′, b, c} and construct
two profiles u, u′ such that u is obtained from u′ when K agents who all like
{a, a′, a′′, b} all declare {a, a′, a′′} and end up better off even though they cannot
consume b anymore (so u′ is the true profile). This property implies a group
version of SP 0.
At profile u the K agents in question declare {a, a′, a′′} and ϕ(u) = z; at u′
they switch to {a, a′, a′′, b} (nothing else changes) and ϕ(u′) = z′. The profiles
are entirely symmetric in a, a′, a′′. We define
za =
1
6
, zb =
1
32
, zc =
15
32
; z′a =
1
16
, z′b =
1
4
, z′c =
9
16
Note that z′aaab < zaaa as desired but zaab < z
′
aab.
We have six types of preferences and ten homogenous coalitions of which the
sizes meet the analog of system (11), (5) for some positive parameters γ, δ:
naaa
zaaa
=
nbc
zbc
= K ,
naaab
zaaab
=
nc
zc
= γK ,
nac
zac
=
naab
zaab
= δK
(we have three coalitions who like one of the a-s and c, and another three who
like two of the a-s and b). This implies ϕ(u) = z. To ensure ϕ(u′) = z′ we need
two instances of the first order condition (13), respectively for b, c and for a∗, b
where a∗ is an arbitrary selection from a, a′, a′′; symmetry implies (13) between
two a-s.
Straightforward computations as above, omitted for brevity, show that (13)
for b,c reduces to
zaaab − z′aaab
z′aaab · z′c
γK +
16
7
K = 3
zac − z′ac
z′ac · z′aab
δK
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and for a∗, b
zaaa − z′aaa
z′aaa · z′bc
K +
za∗c − z′a∗c
z′a∗c · z′aab
δK =
16
3
K
With our choice of z, z′ these equations boil down to
32
85
γ +
16
7
= 3(
2
45
δ) ;
160
39
+
2
45
δ =
16
3
=⇒ γ = 340
91
, δ =
360
13
.
Finally we pick K = 8× 19× 91 = 13832 and get
naaa = nbc = K ; naaab = 17× 85× 19 = 27455 ; nc = 15× 85× 19 = 24225
naab = 35× 90× 56 ≃ 176400, nac = 61× 90× 56 ≃ 307440.
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